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The ability to make inferences about hidden causal mechanisms
underpins scientific and religious thought. It also facilitates the un-
derstanding of social interactions and the production of sophisticated
tool-using behaviors. However, although animals can reason about
the outcomes of accidental interventions, only humans have been
shown tomake inferences about hidden causal mechanisms. Here, we
show that tool-making New Caledonian crows react differently to an
observable event when it is caused by a hidden causal agent. Eight
crowswatched two series of events inwhich a stickmoved. In thefirst
set of events, the crows observed a human enter a hide, a stick move,
and the human then leave the hide. In the second, the stick moved
without a human enteringor exiting the hide. The crows inspected the
hide and abandoned probing with a tool for food more often after
the second, unexplained series of events. This difference shows that
the crows can reason about a hidden causal agent. Comparative
studies with the methodology outlined here could aid in elucidating
the selectivepressures that led to theevolutionof this cognitive ability.
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Imagine a bird looking down on a monkey moving througha forest canopy. Generally, the bird will be able to observe both
the monkey moving and the canopy shaking at the same time.
Sometimes, however, when the canopy is thick overhead, the bird
may only observe that, against a background of stationery leaves,
there are waves of moving leaves that can start and stop abruptly.
Humans are able to imagine why the leaves are moving when
the monkey is out of sight. They can hypothesize that there is
a hidden causal agent that must be moving the leaves because
when the wind is not blowing, the canopy does not shake on its
own. We make such inferences from a very early age. Between
7–10 mo of age, infants begin to show surprise if a bean bag is
thrown from behind a screen and the screen is then lifted to show
an inert object, rather than a causal agent such as a hand (1, 2).
The use of such causal reasoning underpins not only scientific (3)
and religious thought (4, 5) but also our sophisticated tool-using
abilities (6) and understanding of social interactions (7–9). How-
ever, we currently have little idea how such cognition evolved.
One way to increase our knowledge would be to study the
evolution of this type of causal reasoning in other species. Un-
fortunately, there is no evidence to date that any nonhuman
animal has the ability to make inferences about hidden causal
mechanisms (10–14). However, no studies have attempted to
recreate ecological situations, such as the canopy problem out-
lined above, where the ability to make inferences about hidden
causal agents would be highly adaptive. To solve the canopy
problem an animal must infer the presence of a hidden causal
agent from the movement of an inanimate object. We presented
eight New Caledonian crows, a species that has produced be-
havior suggestive of complex causal cognition (15–23), with the
hidden causal agent (HCA) problem. This experimental para-
digm mirrored the canopy problem by creating a situation where
an animal had to infer what caused an inanimate object to move.
The crows were first given experience extracting food with a tool
from a box. The box was then placed close to a novel hide that
had been setup in the crows’ aviary. The entrance to the box
faced the hide, so crows had to turn their heads directly away
from the hide to pull the food out of the tube with the tool.
Testing began once the crows were able to extract the food when
the box was 20 cm from the hide. The crows were first given three
trials of the hidden causal agent (HCA) condition. Here, they
observed two humans walk into the aviary. One, the agent,
walked into the hide and so became hidden from the crows. A
wooden stick was then probed in and out of a hole in the hide
wall 15 times toward the baited hole. The agent then exited the
hide and left the room. At this point the second human, who had
stood 1.5 m from the hide in the corner of the room with closed
eyes and hands held in front of the body, also left the room. The
crow was now free to come down to the table, pick up a tool, and
use it to extract the food from the box. The crows were then
given three trials of the unknown causal agent (UCA) condition.
Here, one human entered the cage and stood in the far corner,
with closed eyes and hands held in front of the body as before.
The tool was then probed through the hole in the hide 15 times.
The human then left, and the crows again were free to come
down to extract food. In both the HCA and UCA conditions, the
stick moved in the same way because it was actually moved by an
experimenter pulling on a string that could be pulled either from
within the hide or from outside the testing room.
The movement of the probing stick was a novel stimulus and,
thus, likely to elicit neophobic responses from the crows. The
movement of the stick was also likely to be an aversive stimulus
for the crows as it moved into the space where the crows would
put their heads when they attempted to extract the food from the
box. When the crows used a tool in the hole, they had to face
away from the hide and, thus, could not easily monitor whether
the stick was being moved. Thus, a repetition of the sticks’
movement was likely to result in the stick hitting the crows in the
back of the head. (Of course, in reality, there was no chance of
the stick hitting the crows because the experimenter never pulled
the string when the crows were on the table.) For the crows to
extract food in this situation, they needed to minimize the per-
ceived risk of being hit by the stick emerging from the hide
during tool use. There were two potential ways they could do
this. First, they could be very cautious after seeing this stick being
probed for the first time. The level of caution would then be
progressively reduced each time the crows used a tool in the box
and the stick did not appear. That is, the crows would initially
show a neophobic response and then gradually habituate (24,
25). An alternative way for the crows to minimize risk would be
for the crows to predict the stick’s movement by reasoning about
why the stick was moving. In the first condition, the crows
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observed the human enter the hide, the stick move, and the
human leave both the hide and cage. If the crows could attribute
the stick’s movement to the hidden human, they could infer that
when the human left the room, the stick would not move again.
In contrast, in the second, unknown condition, if the crows were
capable of causal reasoning, they would predict that the stick
might move again because they had not observed a potential
causal agent leave the hide. This “causal reasoning hypothesis,”
therefore, made the opposite prediction from the “habituation
hypothesis” outlined above. In the hidden agent condition, the
crows should show similar levels of caution to those in the final
trial of habituation to the hide. In the unknown condition, the
crows should show a high level of caution, despite the movement
of the stick no longer being a novel stimulus.
To test between these hypotheses, we measured the degree of
caution in the crows’ behavior. We examined the number of
times the crows both inspected the hide and abandoned probing
across our experiment. Hide inspections were defined as a crow
orientating its head toward the hole and then moving its head
toward the hide, so that one or both eyes was/were in line with
the hide. Orientations to the hide were not scored if the crow was
not first looking toward the baited hole or if the crow looked at
an area of the cage other than the hide after looking at the hole.
An abandoned probe was defined as a crow inserting the tool
into the hole and then leaving the testing area without extracting
the food.
Results and Discussion
Our results provide strong support for the causal reasoning hy-
pothesis. Inspection rates were higher in the three trials of the
UCA condition than in the human agent (HCA) condition
(Wilcoxon signed rank test; n = 8; Z = 3.171; P = 0.002) (Fig. 1
and Movie S1). Every crow also had a higher inspection rate on
the first trial of the UCA condition than the HCA condition
(Wilcoxon signed rank test; n = 8; Z = 2.521; P = 0.008). The
overall difference between conditions was not solely attributable
to differences in inspection rate on the first trial. Inspection rates
were also higher in the unknown condition in the second trial
condition (Wilcoxon signed rank test; n = 8; Z = 2.521; P =
0.008), although not the third trial (Wilcoxon signed rank test;
n = 8; Z= 0.70; P = 0.547) (Fig. 1). In contrast to these results,
there was no difference in inspection rate between the last
habitation trial and the first HCA condition trial (Wilcoxon
signed rank test; n = 8; Z = 0.14; P = 0.945) (Fig. 1). Individual
differences in inspection rate were not significantly different for
crows of different sex (Mann–Whitney rank sum test; n = 8; U =
3; P = 0.2) or age (adults vs. subadult and juvenile) (Mann–
Whitney rank sum test; n = 8; U = 6; P = 0.786).
The differences in inspection rate between the two conditions
were mirrored in other aspects of the crows’ behavior. No crow
abandoned probing in the HCA condition or during the final
trial of habituation. However, in the UCA condition, four birds
stopped probing and left the table at least once (mean ± SE,
2.75 ± 1.03) (Fig. 2). Of the four crows that abandoned probing,
two were male and one was juvenile, which suggests that neither
sex nor age were strong predictors of this response type either.
These results show that New Caledonian crows, like humans,
can attribute an observable event to a hidden causal agent. When
the stick moved while a potential agent was in the hide, and that
agent then departed, the crows had a relatively low inspection
rate. All of the crows we tested, however, increased their in-
spection rates after observing the stick move when no potential
causal agent was present. In fact, inspection rates were far higher
in the first trial of the unknown agent condition than in the first
human agent trial. This was despite the human trial being the
first time the crows had observed the novel stimuli of a stick
emerging from the hide and a human entering and exiting the
hide. Similarly, no crows abandoned probing and left the table
when the stick emerged from the hide for the first time, but some
did when the stick’s movement could not be attributed to a
causal agent. Given the probing stick was a novel, aversive
stimulus to the crows, a purely associative account would struggle
to explain why the crows reacted to this stimulus in the unknown
causal condition but not in the human condition. This pattern of
Fig. 1. Inspection rate across conditions. Final habituation trial before
testing is indicated by 20cm hab. (Upper Left ) Diagram of the HCA condi-
tion. (Upper Right) Diagram of the UCA condition. In the HCA condition, one
human walked into the hide and one stood in the corner of the room. A
wooden stick was then probed from the hide. The agent then exited the
hide. Both humans then left the room. In the UCA condition, one human
entered the cage and stood in the corner. The tool was then probed through
the hole. The human then left.
Fig. 2. Average probes abandoned across conditions. Final habituation trial
before testing is indicated by 20cm hab. An abandoned probe was defined
as a crow inserting the tool into the hole and then leaving the testing area
without extracting the food.
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results is, however, predicted by a causal account of the crows’
actions: the crows attributed the movement of the stick in the
human condition to the agent inside the hide and, so, inferred
that the stick was unlikely to be probed again once the human
had left the hide. In the unknown condition, there was no re-
cently departed causal agent to attribute the movement of the
stick to, so the crows reasoned the stick could be probed again.
Darwin himself speculated that a dog barking at a parasol
moving slightly in a breeze might be because the dog reasoned
that “movement without any apparent cause indicated the pres-
ence of some strange living agent” (26). There is also evidence of
crows reacting differently to the presence of hunters remaining
within versus vacating a hide (27). Our results suggest that these
animal behaviors may be underpinned by complex cognition. The
ability to make inferences about why an inanimate object is
moving would be highly adaptive in many ecological situations,
such as the canopy problem outlined above. It is, therefore,
possible that the ability to reason about hidden causal agents is
far more widespread in the animal kingdom than has been
thought previously. Alternatively, additional selective pressures
may be required to scaffold the evolution of this ability, such as
those created by extractive foraging (28), tool use, tool manu-
facture, and complex social interactions (29). Future comparative
tests presenting the HCA methodology to animal species with
different levels of sociality, tool use, and predation should help in
understanding the type of selective pressures that led to the evo-
lution of this ability.
Methods
We carried out the experiment with eight wild crows captured on the island
of Maré, New Caledonia. Five of the crows were adults, and three were
subadults. Based on sexual size dimorphism (30), four were females. The
crows were housed in a five-cage outdoor aviary; the cages varied in size but
were all at least 8 m2 in area and 3 m high. All crows were released at their
site of capture after testing. Birds were not deprived of food before testing.
Habituation to the blue hide (200 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm) began with the
crows being given trials extracting food from a box (15 cm × 5 cm × 2 cm)
facing away from the hide and positioned 100 cm away. Once the crows had
reached a criterion of extracting food in two consecutive 3-min trials, the
box was positioned 100 cm away but facing the hide. Once criterion was
again reached, the box was then put 50 cm and then 20 cm away. Once
crows again reached criterion, the box was positioned 20 cm away from the
hide. Criterion at this point was changed to extracting food within one trial
of 60 s. If crows did not reach criterion, the box was placed at the last dis-
tance the crows reached criterion. Crows had to reach criterion again to
move to the closer distance. Once the 20-cm criterion was passed, the crows
received the HCA condition and then the UCA condition. Trial 1 of the HCA
condition was, therefore, the first time the crows had observed a human
enter or exit the hide. In both conditions, the same experimenter pulled the
string. The presence of the second human in both conditions was to ensure
the crow did not interact with the apparatus when the stick was moving. A
trial started when the crow landed on the table and ended when the crow
got food or after 2 min. Inspection rate was calculated as the number of hide
inspections over the latency between a crow picking up a tool and extracting
the food. Data were coded by two observers. Interreliability was 91%. This
study was carried out under the ethics approval of the University of Auck-
land (reference no. R602).
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